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The philosophy of Bergson has not been studied in depth from the socio-political point of 
view. Nevertheless I think that this aspect of his philosophy allows us to understand his 
significance and relevance. Bergson is a thinker who concentrates on current problems and his 
reflections on socio-political issues show him to be more a thinker of the 20
th
 and 21
st
 century 
than a 19
th
 century one. 
To understand the relevance and validity of his socio-political thought one has to carefully 
reread Bergson‟s last work, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, and his works and his 
speeches during the War. It is necessary to see it in its intellectual context and also to recover 
its philosophical argument: the origin of violence and conflict and its control by means of 
democratic forms of coexistence, which promote relationships between different societies and 
the recognition of the necessity of international organisations as a form of mediation between 
different nations.  
This means being aware of Bergson‟s political work and his approach to the relationship 
between philosophy and politics, his understanding of politics, his conditions and limits, and 
particularly his belief in an open society due to the intervention of charismatic figures and 
international organizations.  
 
In this paper I intend to explain the historical political role played by 
Bergson during the First World War and I will later deal with his political 
ideas, focusing mainly on the relationship between the politician and the 
philosopher, the characteristics of politics taken as a charismatic guide and the 
necessity for openness in order to achieve proper coexistence between human 
beings: democracy and international organizations. The first point I would like 
to emphasise in this paper could be called Bergson‟s political role, which 
centres for the most part on his missions during the First World War and his 
role as President of the League of Nations International Commission for 
Intellectual Collaboration (later UNESCO) in the years following the Great 
War.  
 
 
1. Bergson as a politician 
 
Henri Bergson was a philosopher of international renown when the First 
World War broke out, and he also had many friends in the USA
1
. For this 
reason, as he states in “Mes missions”, the French government asked him to 
                                                 
1
  He was a friend of William James and in 1913 had travelled to the USA as a “delegate of 
the board of the University of Paris” (Soulez, P., Bergson politique, PUF, Paris, 1989, p. 51) as 
a guest of the Columbia, Princeton and Harvard universities.  
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take on his first mission as a kind of „diplomat without portfolio‟ in charge of 
presenting the affairs of France to President Wilson with the idea of persuading 
him to abandon his vacillation on the War, or rather his declaration of 
neutrality
2
.  
In 1917 Bergson travelled to the US, where he had meetings with several 
members of the President‟s entourage, particularly with Colonel House, and 
with Wilson himself. In these meetings, and in the various speeches he gave, 
Bergson focused on three key aspects: American idealism as a characteristic of 
this young nation which was to play a major role in history
3
; reinforcement of 
the idea of Bismarck as a defender of force over right, and of Germany as a 
country that, because it pursued unity in a mechanical and highly militarized 
way, was a staunch enemy of democracy and right
4
; and finally, the need for 
understanding among nations through right: the creation of a League of 
Nations.  
On the first issue, Bergson always held that the US was born of a mighty 
freedom ideal, and that its participation in the War was because of this ideal 
                                                 
2
  There are at least two works by historians on the role played by Bergson in the Entry of 
America into the First World War: Kaspi, A., Le temps des Américains. Le concours américain 
à la France en 1916-1918, Publications de La Sorbonne, Paris I-Panthéon, Série internationale 
6, Université de la Sorbonne, Institut des relations internationales contemporaines (IHEIC), 
Paris, 1976. Nouailhat, Y.-H., France et les États-Unis, août 1914-avril 1917, Publications de la 
Sorbonne, Série internationale 10, Université de la Sorbonne, Institut des relations 
internationales contemporaines (IHEIC), Paris, 1979. However, both works are partial and do 
not deal with Bergson‟s second mission.  
3
  “La note dominante de l‟âme américaine est un certain idéalisme. […] Un idéalisme qui 
côtoie parfois le mysticisme, et qui est toujours fortement imprégné de sentiment”; Bergson, H., 
“Discours au Comité France-Amérique”, June 1913, in Mélanges, PUF, Paris, 1972, p. 994. He 
defines idealism using several features: curiosity about spiritual things, the habit of placing such 
things above all else, and particularly the habit of considering life as having been created for the 
fulfilment of something which does not yet exist, but which will give a new meaning to life on 
being fulfilled. Cfr. pp. 994-995.  
4  This is clearly seen in the “Discours en séance publique de l‟Académie des sciences 
morales et politique”, 12th December 1914. Bergson begins by underlining his horror and 
indignation at the crimes of Germany: “la civilisation avait déjà connu, sur tel ou tel de ses 
points, des retours offensifs de la barbarie; mais c‟est la première fois que toutes les puissances 
du mal se dressent ensemble, coalisées, pour lui donner assaut”; in Mélanges, p. 1107-1108.  
In his opinion, the internal disorder of Germany could have been solved in time, as an 
organic force. But in Germany there was a force, compelled by Prussia, which wanted this union 
by mechanical means, which wanted to unite everything like “une machine bien montée”, p. 
1108. Unfortunately the unification was carried out in the latter way. Germany left aside its own 
philosophers and in order to be convinced that there were pre-destined races, looked abroad, to 
Gobineau, who was not read in France. Cfr. p. 1113.  
Thus war is totally destructive: “il n‟en est pas moins vrai qu‟une ambition perverse, 
lorsqu‟elle s‟est erigée en théorie, se sent plus à son aise pour aller jusqu‟au bout d‟elle-même: 
elle rejettera ainsi sur la logique une part de la responsabilité. Si la race germanique est la race 
élue, elle sera la seule qui ait le droit absolue de vivre; les autres seront des races qu‟elle tolère, 
et cette tolérance sera précisement ce qu‟on appelle l‟état de paix. Vienne la guerre: c‟est 
l‟anéantissement de l‟ennemi que l‟Allemagne devra poursuive. Elle ne s‟en prendra pas 
seulement aux combattants; elle massacrera les femes, les enfants, les viellards; elle pillera, elle 
incendiera: l‟idéal serait de détruire les villes, les villages, toute la population”; p. 1113. 
Moreover, in this situation, barbarianism uses the forces of civilization: science and industry. 
Cfr. pp. 1114-1115.  
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and not because of economic or defensive interests (in such a case, it could 
simply have waged a partial war centred on the problem of submarine attack)
5
. 
Moreover, this fits in with his vision of President Wilson as a man of letters, 
whose main occupation would be human happiness. Due to his strong 
Platonism, Bergson always believed in a philosopher as a servant of the city, 
which idea was fulfilled by the American president, as it was by King Albert of 
Belgium
6
, but not by the German intellectuals who were in no way interested in 
politics.  
On the second point, Bergson presented Bismarck as a pre-Hitler who was 
incapable of understanding the proper relationship between force and right
7
 and 
insisted on the need to teach Germany that it was not invincible, because, as it 
was fascinated by force, it would not stop and would destroy the democratic 
ideals of the countries it was subduing by force
8
. This leads to the third 
concern. Bergson attempted to convince President Wilson that he, like France, 
believed that what was important was to keep the future peace in mind, a peace 
created by the Americans following the fundaments of the French Revolution: 
individual rights and an international regime of rights, which are also the ideals 
of the League of Nations. But for these ideals to be achieved, America had to 
enter the war.  
On his second mission, in 1918, Bergson was to convince Wilson that the 
US should enter with Japan on the Eastern front, in Russia, using the Trans-
Siberian route in order to force the Germans to divide their forces, and thus 
take pressure off the Western front. The French philosopher began by 
suggesting economic aid for Russia and a later military intervention. However, 
this time not only did he fail to convince Wilson, but also showed the 
shortcomings of his political grasp, in spite of the assistance of expert political 
                                                 
5
  “Mais, avec de la discrétion toute seule, on ne pouvait rien obtenir. Il était essentiel de faire 
connaître à Wilson et à son entourage la vraie nature de la guerre que nos faisait l‟Allemagne. Il 
était essentiel aussi de rechercher et d‟amener à la pleine lumière, pour en combattre l‟effet, les 
deux ou trois causes profondes de l‟indécision de Wilson. Surtout, il fallait montrer à un 
président naturellement idéaliste, l‟occassion unique qui s‟offrait à lui de restaurer la paix dans 
le monde et, comme je le disais plus haut, d‟ouvrir une ère nouvelle dans l‟histoire de 
l‟humanité”; Bergson, H., in Mélanges, p. 1559. Bergson emphasises the idealistic character of 
the USA in its wars in the “Discours au banquet de la société France-Amérique à New York”, in 
Mélanges, pp. 1243-1248.  
6
  In “Hommage au roi Albert et au peuple belge”, Bergson states as follows: “il a fait par 
avance le sacrifice de tout ce qu‟il avait et de tout ce qu‟il était: ses villes et ses villages, sa 
fortune et sa vie, il a tout donné à une idée, à la conception héroïque qu‟il s‟était faite de 
l‟honneur. Gloire à lui! Gloire à son roi! J‟ai dit, j‟ai enseigné pendant longtemps que l‟histoire 
était une école d‟immoralité. Je ne le dirai plus, après l‟exemple que la Belgique vient de donner 
au monde. Un acte comme celui-là rachète les plus grandes vilenies de l‟humanité. Il fait qu‟on 
se sent plus fier d‟être homme”; Bergson, H., in Mélanges, p. 1130.  
7
  For Bergson right as a power is force, but not physical force. So he recognises that right 
means recognising the legitimacy of other forces, together with the need to regulate them using 
reason. Reflections on the idea of right and force, influenced by Bergson, appear in Patocka‟s 
book: Essais hérétiques sur la philosophie de l’histoire, where he states that in the Great War it 
was force and not right that was used to evaluate others.  
8
  According to Soulez, the 1914 war can be interpreted, to a great extent, as a controversy 
between French philosophers and German historians on the meaning of the unification of 
Germany. Cfr. Soulez, P., Bergson politique, p. 143.  
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assessors on Russia, Romania and the Eastern front: he did not understand 
Russia or his mission
9
. After this fiasco, Bergson refused a third mission, 
which in fact was merely honorary. When weighing up his “diplomatic” role in 
the Great War, he concluded that his fame has “allowed him to be truly useful 
to France during the war”10, which was of great importance for him.  
On the subject of his work for the League of Nations International 
Cooperation Commission, Bergson was its first chairman and assisted in 
setting down the bases for international intellectual cooperation, the sub-
commissions and their roles. He also headed the 1923 commission, which, 
among other issues, dealt with the subject of Esperanto. On this point, he stated 
that the aim of the League of Nations was to bring countries closer together, 
and that this was mainly achieved by understanding each other‟s languages, 
which would disappear with the establishment of an artificial language
11
.  
After the war
12
, Bergson needed more than ever to properly understand the 
relations between nations and to establish international organizations to 
achieve such understanding. For some, nations cannot interrelate through 
rights: “Justice exists, but only in the relations between individuals and the 
state, not in relations between states. One state has no duties towards another; it 
only has duties towards itself, and these duties can all be summarized in just 
one: being strong, becoming stronger and stronger”13.  
That is to say, international relations are based on strength, not on rights. 
This means that a small, weak nation exists only because the strong nations 
tolerate its existence. And particularly that nations do not interrelate through 
agreements nor because of their given word: “Agreements exist, but there is a 
certain level of equilibrium between the forces present only at a given moment; 
when the balance changes, the agreement, which was but the verification of 
this agreement, is virtually broken, and will in fact be broken if one of the 
parties is interested in so doing”14.  
These views imply that the strong nations would have the right and duty to 
impose their organization and dominance on the rest of the world, thus creating 
a mechanical unity: “The unification resulting from this would be very 
different from the first, a unification which would not proceed from the consent 
of nations, where each could develop its personality and individuality, rather, 
on the contrary, it would proceed from a kind of coercion which would impose 
a certain mechanical uniformity on humankind. This would also be unity, but, 
                                                 
9
  Cfr. Soulez, P., Bergson politique, p. 204. 
10
  Bergson, H., “Mes missions”, in Mélanges, p. 1555.  
11
  “Dès lors, le rôle de la Société des Nations et de sa Commision est de pousser à l‟étude des 
langues vivantes, et non pas à celle de la langue artificielle. Ce n‟est pas à dire, encore une fois, 
que la langue artificielle ne finisse pas par s‟imposer. Mais il appartient à d‟autres, il 
n‟appartient pas à la Société des Nations, de prendre sa cause en mains”; Bergson, H., in 
Mélanges, p. 1416.  
12
  However, in 1917, during the war, Bergson states that the League of Nations will have to 
wait to be established, as it is very unlikely that Germany will renounce its present mentality 
and because, under the circumstances, it is more suitable to consider a federation of allies than a 
league of nations. Nevertheless, he believes these opinions should not be published at the time. 
Cfr. Bergson, H., “Letter to ¿ (16 August 1917)”, in Mélanges, pp. 1271-1272.  
13
  Bergson, H, “La personnalité”, in Mélanges, p. 1232.  
14
  Bergson, H, “La personnalité”, p. 1232.  
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it has to be said, an abstract, poor, empty unity; the unity of a machine and not 
the harmonious fruitful unity of life”15. 
In contrast with this view of relations between nations, Bergson considers 
that the League of Nations, politicians and philosophers, must establish a 
proper relationship based on rights, which in fact is simply the correct 
definition of democracy: “The term „Democracy‟, in America, is of extremely 
deep and philosophical significance. The regime of Democracy is Reason, pure 
Reason that replaces Force, Instinct and even Tradition. If it has to do with the 
relations between citizens in a State, these relations, in the way they have been 
regulated little by little by historical incidents and accidents, by traditions, are 
not relations of strict justice, of equality in Law. But what Reason demands is 
this equality in Law. A democratic regime is one that, taking Force, Tradition 
and all historical eventualities as an abstraction, considers one man as equal to 
another, because all men are part of some infinite superior nature, and therefore 
the dignity of every man is eminent and the value of every man is absolute. 
This refers to the relations of citizens with the state itself.  
This concept of Democracy is also a concept of the relations between 
States. Here again, what have Tradition, Force and Instinct done? They have 
led to oppression of the weak by the strong. If we ignore all this, and accept the 
perspective of pure reason, the fact that a state is large or small does not matter: 
only moral persons exist, in equality, equal in Law.  
If we accept these concepts of the state and the relations between states, 
then […] the regime of Force is abolished. The regime of force is followed by 
the regime of Law. This is why Americans believe and say that Democracy is 
in its essence peaceful and also that any lasting, definitive peace is in its 
essence democratic”16.  
Keeping this „political‟ activity of Bergson‟s in mind, Soulez concludes 
that “few philosophers have been so active in politics in their times, […] 
Bergson never followed a party political line. He was more interested in the 
institutions than in the area of political debate surrounding them”17. However, 
he always abstained from getting involved in specific political matters and did 
not take part in the major issues that affected his country and Europe in the pre- 
and post-war years.  
This partially explain why Bergson has been forgotten and his socio-
political thinking has been rejected. Bergson was seen as an “organic 
intellectual” of the Third Republic, a defender of patriotic liberal order. This is 
linked to the fact that the First World War and the Russian Revolution brought 
about radical change in the situation and in the most pressing concerns, which 
distanced the new generations from the Bergson‟s work. The era of the thinker 
of élan vital seemed to be over, and his place appeared to have been occupied 
by others who were not allies of the “State and class whose tool it is”18, who 
                                                 
15
  Bergson, H, “La personnalité”, p. 1234.  
16
  Bergson, H., “L‟amitié franco-américaine (June 1917)”, in Mélanges, pp. 1263-1264.  
17
  Soulez, P., Bergson politique, p. 13.  
18
  Politzer, G., La fin d’une parade philosophique: le bergsonisme, Les rues, Paris, 1929, pp. 
10-11. Politzer focused his criticism on the disciples‟ deviations (which would not affect 
Bergson‟s philosophy); on his psychology, which Politzer contrasted with the psychoanalytical 
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would represent a more specific philosophy: Marx-Lenin, Freud and Husserl. 
Indeed, Bergson lost contact with the concerns of the young people of the 
times, and resigned from his post at the Collège de France in 1920; in France 
his philosophy was replaced by that of Husserl
19
. 
 
 
2. Bergson’s political philosophy: the origins of violence and its control 
 
Now that we have established the political activity of Bergson, it is time to 
deal with his vision of politics and of politicians as men of action or 
charismatic leaders. In the first place, Bergson considered that the difference 
between a philosopher and a politician must be clear, as the latter can resort to 
lies, even in order to tell the truth
20
; But the philosopher is searching for the 
truth and formulates problems. Moreover, the philosopher is the equivalent of 
homo sapiens, whereas the politician is homo loquax
21
, which means that he is 
a person who appeals to language with an aim: “his function is to set up 
communication in view of cooperation”22. For Bergson the philosopher is one 
who can wait for the effect, while the politician can produce it. Their fields are 
different, but the main difference between a politician and a philosopher has to 
do with their areas of responsibility: the philosopher develops his intuition in a 
theoretical line, as contemplation; however, the politician moves in a practical 
area. This is why the features of a good politician have to do with skills related 
to sociability and direction of people.  
                                                                                                                                 
perspective and urged a comparison between Bergson and Freud on the idea of the concrete and 
the method of analysis; and particularly on the fact that he was bourgeois. Cfr. Soulez, P., 
Bergson politique, pp. 21-23.  
19
  The first philosopher who, having been greatly influenced by Bergson, introduced the 
phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger to France was Levinas, whose thesis became a classic 
at the time and drove Sartre to become interested in this new movement.  
20
  “Un diplomate, homme d‟esprit, se plaisait à répéter que le meilleur moyen de tromper les 
cours, c‟est de leur dire la vérité. Il connaissait ses adversaires et ne les estimait pas assez naïfs 
pour croire à la parole d‟un homme d‟Etat, fût-il honnête. En ce sens nous sommes tous plus ou 
moins diplomates: nous regardons trop loin ou trop haut, et lorsque la vérité est sous nos yeux, 
nous passons sans l‟appercevoir”, Guitton, J., La vocation de Bergson, Gallimard, Paris, 1960. 
Quoted in Soulez, P., Bergson politique, p. 217. Thus Bergson distrusts this kind of people: “We 
consider intelligence very highly, but we do not appreciate the „intelligent man‟, who is skilled 
in speaking on all subjects. Skill to speak, ready to criticise”; Bergson, H., El pensamiento y lo 
moviente, La Pleyade, Paris, p. 81. 
21
  “Homo faber is the definition we suggest. Homo sapiens, born of the reflection of Homo 
faber on his making, seems to us to be worthy of esteem in that he uses pure intelligence to 
solve the problems which depend entirely on him: in the choice of these problems a philosopher  
may err, another philosopher will correct him; both will have done what they can; both deserve 
our recognition and admiration. Homo faber, Homo sapiens, although there is confusion about 
which is which, we bow to you both. The only one we do not like is Homo loquax, whose 
thinking, when he thinks, is merely a reflection of his words”; Bergson, H., El pensamiento, p. 
82. 
22
  Bergson, H., Oeuvres, PUF, Paris, 1970, p. 1321. Conversely, the philosopher has no 
recourse to this mode of language, as he would miss the true significance of reality: intuition of 
length. Cfr. El pensamiento y lo moviente; Introducción a la metafísica.  
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The first feature of the charismatic guide must be courtesy: “It seems, 
thus, that the power to contract long-lasting habits, appropriate to the 
circumstances and place in which one finds oneself and the place which one 
wants to occupy in the world, then demand another faculty which corrects or 
attenuates their effects, the faculty of relinquishing, if necessary, the habits one 
had acquired or even those natural aptitudes that one has managed to develop, 
the faculty of putting oneself in the other‟s position, of being interested in their 
occupations, of thinking their thoughts, of re-living their lives, in short, of 
forgetting oneself. This is what courtesy of spirit signifies, I believe it is no 
more than a kind of intellectual agility. The real man of the world can talk to 
everyone on what interests them, can penetrate into the views of others without 
always adopting them, he understands everything, without excusing it all”23.  
For Bergson the most outstanding trait in a politician is his good sense: 
“Therefore I see in good sense the inner energy of an intelligence that is always 
re-conquering itself, eliminating prior ideas to make space for ideas that are 
formed and modelled on what is real through the constant effort of persevering 
action. And I also see in him the splendour of a morally intense heart, precision 
of ideas modelled on the sentiment of justice, in any case, spirit strengthened 
by character. Our philosophy, based on the distinctions mentioned, draws a 
very clear divisory line between intelligence and will, between morality and 
knowledge, between thought and action. And these are, in fact, the two 
different directions where human nature is committed to develop. But it seems 
to me that action and thought have a common source, which is neither pure will 
nor pure intelligence, and this source is good sense”24.  
That is, this capacity is at the same time theoretical and practical, or, to be 
more exact, it is prior to such a difference
25
. Thus neither education nor 
                                                 
23
  Bergson, H., “La politesse”, in Mélanges, pp. 321-322. These ideas are very similar to 
Arendt‟s approach to the lengthened mentality, which is not only the capacity to see the other‟s 
point of view, but also to adopt the most varied perspectives. For this reason it appeals to the 
imagination. Understanding the other‟s point of view is training „to go visiting‟, which 
presupposes a commitment to think for oneself, and not be seduced by others. The lengthened 
mentality does not mean taking on the other‟s position (this would mean being the other and not 
judging), but judging one‟s own judgement from the public perspective. Moreover, Arendt 
identifies Kant‟s lengthened mentality with the Aristotelian phronesis and sensus comunis. To 
understand reality, we must leave aside all of one‟s own interests, and take the diverse 
perspectives provided by others into account. Arendt also adds that the truth implies an element 
of coercion, as it implies validity that is beyond argument. Thus from the perspective of politics, 
the truth is despotic. For politics a broad mentality is necessary, because the quality of an 
opinion depends on its degree of impartiality. Opinions are never evident and imply discursive 
thinking. There are areas of truth in all societies and politics cannot influence them. The sphere 
of politics is limited by “the things that man cannot change” according to his will. Only if it 
respects its own borders, that field where we are free to act and change will remain intact, and 
will keep and uphold its promises”; Arendt, H., Entre el pasado y el futuro Ocho ejercicios 
sobre la reflexión política, Península, Barcelona, 1996. p. 277. 
24
  Bergson, H., “Le bon sens et les études classiques”, in Mélanges, p. 365.  
25
  This is one of the points on which Bergson is most insistent: good sense is the point of 
union of reason and will, and therefore offers “la solution socialement utile, celle qui facilite le 
langage et favorise l‟action [...] Il semble donc que le bon sens procède en matière spéculative 
par un appel au vouloir, et en matière pratique par un recours à la raison. De sorte qu‟on pourrait 
être tenté de voir en lui, l‟effet d‟un mélange, d‟un accord intime entre les exigences de la 
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instruction
26
 nor even experience is enough to attain it. As it is the most useful 
sense for social life it is a characteristic of everyone, but at the same time it can 
grow and must be properly cared for.  
In any case, what the French philosopher is most interested in is to 
emphasise its functions: “On the subject of behaviour, to differentiate what is 
essential from what is accessory or indifferent; to chose from among the 
diverse possibilities the one which will give the greatest possible returns of 
good, not imaginable but rather feasible: this is, I believe, the role of good 
sense […] good sense is charged with our relations with people”27.  
Thus it is the capacity to choose correctly from among the options 
presented in our daily lives. This capacity, good sense, must be an active 
attention; must always fit in with situations which are always new. For his 
reason, Bergson moves between the spirit of routine, which rejects any change, 
and the spirit of fantasy, which hopes for miraculous transformations. It is the 
capacity to find the fulcrum between change and immobility, which would give 
the necessary stability to social life
28
 and the indispensable openness for 
coexistence and growth, by emphasising the power for transformation which is 
proper to human freedom
29
. As this is its function, Bergson considers it a 
means of doing things and not a method, and situates it close to the role played 
by genius in art and science
30
. However, this is not the fundamental core of 
good sense: “Clarity of ideas, firmness of attention, freedom and moderation of 
judgement, all this is what shapes the material wrappings of good sense; but its 
soul is passion for justice”31.  
                                                                                                                                 
pensée et celles de l‟action. [...] Mais j‟inclinerais, pour le fond, à envisager les choses tout 
autrement, à voir dans le bon sens la disposition originelle, et au contraire dans les habitudes de 
la pensée et les lois de la volonté, deux émanations, deux développements divergents de cette 
faculté primitive d‟orientation”; Bergson, H., “Le bon sens”, pp. 365-366.  
26
  “Je voudrais montrer que le bon sens consiste en partie dans une disposition active de 
l‟intelligence, mais en partie aussi dans une certaine défiance toute particulière de l‟intelligence 
vis-à-vis d‟elle-même; que l‟instruction lui fournit un soutien, mais qu‟il pousse ses racines à 
des profondeurs où l‟instruction ne pénètre guère”; Bergson, H., “Le bon sens”, p. 360. 
27
  Bergson, H., “Le bons sens”, p. 361.  
28
  “The essential aim of society is to insert a certain firmness into universal mobility”. 
Bergson, H., El pensamiento, p. 81. 
29
  “Il y a une erreur grave, qui consiste à raisonner dans la société comme sur la nature, à y 
découvrir je ne sais quel mécanisme des liens inéluctables, à méconnaître enfin l‟efficacité du 
vouloir et la force créatrice de la liberté. Il en est une autre, celle des esprits chimériques, qui 
posent la formule d‟un ideal simple, et en déduisent géométriquement les conséquences pour 
l‟organisation de la société, comme si les définitions dépendent ici de nous, comme si notre 
liberté ne rencontrait pas une limite, dans les conditions mêmes de la nature humaine et de la vie 
sociale. Le bon sens tient le milieu entre ces deux imitations maladroites de la physique et de la 
géométrie. Peut-être n‟a-t-il pas de méthode à proprement parler, mais plutôt une certaine 
manière de faire”; Bergson, H., “Le bon sens”, p. 369. 
30
  Cfr. Bergson, H., “Le bon sens”, p. 362. But in a way that is also a method: “tension, 
concentration, such are the words we use to characterize a method that demands of talent an 
entirely new effort for each new problem”; Bergson, H. El pensamiento, p. 86. 
31
  Cfr. Bergson, H., “Le bon sens”, p. 372. Bergson calls it the tact of practical truth: “le bon 
sens raisonne, je le veux bien, et sur des principes généraux parfois; mais il commence par les 
infléchir dans la direction de la réalité présente; et ce travail d‟adaptation, qui ne relève plus du 
raisonnement pur, n‟est-il pas justement l‟office propre du bon sens? Non, le bon sens ne réside 
ni dans une expérience plus vaste, ni dans les souvenirs mieux classés, ni dans une déduction 
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Taking these characteristics belonging to politics in mind, Bergson 
concludes that, when faced with political issues, a philosopher is like anyone 
else and must exercise judgement with the aid of good sense. But at the same 
time, he accepts that he may have a certain advantage, as he better understands 
the role of the institutions as factors for stability
32
.  
Taking these statements of Bergson‟s into account, it is necessary to 
explain his theory on the philosopher-king. The Frenchman shows his 
agreement with the platonic theory when he speaks of the growth of Columbia 
University during the presidency of Nicholas Murray Butler
33
 and of King 
Albert of Belgium
34
. This means that there are lines of convergence between 
the philosopher and the politician, at least in some cases.  
In Bergson‟s work, these examples emphasize the exceptionality of the 
charismatic guide: “Let us realize that the art of governing a great people is the 
only one for which there is no preparatory technique or effective education, 
particularly when dealing with the highest positions. The extreme scarcity of 
politicians of certain importance is due to the fact that they, constantly and in 
great detail, have to solve problems which have been made unsolvable by the 
extension of societies. Study the history of the great modern nations: you will 
find great sages, great artists, great soldiers, great specialists on every subject, 
but, how many great statesmen?”35.  
                                                                                                                                 
plus exacte, ni même, plus généralement, dans une logique plus rigoureuse. Instrument, avant 
tout, de progrès social, il ne peut tirer sa force que du principe même de la vie sociale, l‟esprit 
de justice [...] Je parle de la justice, incarnée dans l‟homme juste, de la justice vivante et 
agissante, attentive à s‟insérer dans les événements, mais pesant dans sa balance l‟acte et la 
conséquence, et ne craignant rien tant que d‟acheter le bien au prix d‟un plus grand mal. La 
justice, quand elle se réalise dans un homme de bien, devient un sens délicat, une vision ou 
plutôt un tact de la vérité pratique”; Bergson, H., “Le bon sens”, p. 364. 
32
  “Son analyse du changement laisse cette question intacte. Pour peu qu‟il ait du bon sens, il 
jugera nécessaire, comme tout le monde, une certaine permanence de ce qui est. Il dira que les 
institutions doivent fournir un cadre relativement invariable à la diversité et à la mobilité des 
desseins individuels. Et il comprendra peut-être mieux que d‟autres le rôle de ces institutions. 
Ne contribuent-elles pas dans le domaine de l‟action, en posant les impératifs, à l‟oeuvre de 
stabilisation que les sens et l‟entendement accomplissent dans le domaine de la connaissance 
quand ils condensent en perception les oscillations de la matière, et en concepts l‟écoulement 
des choses? Sans doute, dans le cadre rigide des institutions, soutenues par cette rigidité, la 
société évolue. Même, le devoir de l‟homme d‟Etat est de suivre ces variations et de modifier 
l‟institution quand il en est encore temps: sur dix erreurs politiques, il y en a neuf qui consistent 
simplement à croire encore vrai ce qui a cessé de l‟être. Mais la dixième, qui pourra être la plus 
grave, sera de ne plus croire vrai ce qui l‟est pourtant encore”; Bergson, H., Oeuvres, pp. 1329-
1330.  
33
  “Et, vraiment, quand on les a vus à l‟oeuvre l‟un et l‟autre, on comprend mieux et l‟on se 
sent tout prêt à accepter –pour ma part, je l‟acceptais depuis longtemps, mais je n‟osais pas le 
dire, par modestie– oui, l‟on se sent prêt à accepter le mot de Platon, que „tout irait bien dans le 
monde si les philosophes étaient rois, ou si les rois faisaient de la philosophie‟”; Bergon, H., in 
Mélanges, p. 998. 
34
  “Je le voudrais, car la philosophie recueillerait alors quelque chose de sa gloire. Deux fois, 
au cours des siècles, elle a brille autour d‟un trône, et, les deux fois, elle aura été associée à la 
plus haute vertu. Elle inspira jadis le stoïcisme de Marc-Aurèle. Elle sortit aujourd‟hui avec 
amour à l‟héroïsme simple et sublime du roi Albert”; Bergson, H., in Mélanges,  p. 1130. 
35
  Bergson, H., Las dos fuentes de la moral y de la religión, Tecnos, Madrid, 1996, p. 351.  
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The philosopher is political when he appeals to good sense, but he is 
more prepared than others to achieve it because it has to do with what is 
changing and intuition, which is that form of knowledge used by a philosopher, 
it is the ability to understand reality as duration
36
. The sensible man, on 
understanding the change, can alter his discourse and moreover, find “the most 
useful social solution, that which facilitates language and favours action”37. 
That is, what the philosopher-king truly contributes to modern plural 
democracies is his capacity to understand what is mobile and changing by 
dealing with it as it should be done, which fosters the habit of discussion and 
conversation on that decision-making that affects what is common.  
On this point the philosopher-king is as extraordinary as the great mystics, 
with whom he shares the power to get to the bottom of reality and is “the 
intermediary between the ideal and the group and the mediator on the relations 
the group has with itself”38. That is, the philosopher-king is an exceptional 
human being who possesses within himself the functions of leader, philosopher 
and prophet
39
. The paradigmatic examples for Bergson are the Greek sages
40
. 
This means that really he is not a leader, nor a governor, but rather a 
legislator
41
. Thus his role is persuasive and he must not resort to coercion, but 
to words.  
The role of the politician as a legislator is precisely to break with the closed 
character of human societies, to end the human tendency to close the group 
around himself. This means asking the politician to put an end to a typical 
characteristic of the politics, which by excluding the other “bears the seed of 
extermination”42. In his final work, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, 
Bergson searches for the root of society and politics, more specifically, of 
violence and war, in order to attempt to propose an alternative. Therefore, 
having developed the analysis of society, morality and open religion, he 
concludes with his famous “final observations” where he shows the limits of 
politics taken in a „natural‟ sense and attempts to reach a type of politics which 
is open to justice
 43
.  
                                                 
36
  Thus in Matière et Mémoire, Bergson states that attention (another term he uses to refer to 
intuition) selects memories and has a social meaning.  
37
  Bergson, H., Mélanges, p. 365.  
38
  Bergson, H., Las dos fuentes, p. 162. This similarity can be seen clearly in the comparison 
that Bergson establishes with W. (Washington-Wilson) and Joan of Arc and Moses. Cfr. MAE, 
Papiers d‟agent Bergson 207, chem. 5.  
39
  Soulez underlines the similarity of these ideas with those of Freud in Moïse et le 
monothéisme, which shows a difference between open morality (the moral idea which is 
defended) and closed morality (the personality of the great man), a subject which Lacan also 
returns to. Cfr. Soulez, P., Bergson politique, pp. 162-163, p. 276.  
40
  Bergson, H., Oeuvres, p. 1040.  
41
  These Bergsonian ideas are in the same line as those of Rousseau. Cfr. Polin, R., La 
politique de la solitude. Essai sur J.-J. Rousseau, Sirey, Paris, 1971, pp. 221-236.  
42
  Soulez, P., Bergson politique, p. 283. “Nevertheless murder is still too often the ratio 
ultima, when it is not the prima, of politics”; Bergson, H., Oeuvres, p. 356.  
43  This capacity to go beyond politics and address justice is one of the qualities that Bergson 
admires in Wilson: “j‟ai voué à Wilson, en 1917, l‟admiration et la reconnaissance les plus 
profondes. Je conserve ces sentiments intacts, et je les conserverai jusqu‟à mom dernier jour, 
plutôt renforcés par l‟universelle ingratitude avec laquelle on traite ce vrai homme, qui voulut 
ouvrir une ère nouvelle dans l‟histoire du monde en suspendant la politique au righteousness, à 
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Firstly, Bergson states that humankind is social by nature, as society 
responds to a natural instinct, which can later be increased artificially
44
. Thus 
the natural tendency to live in society created a type of grouping based on the 
obligation where the individual must harmonize his superfluous self with his 
profound, intimate self. But even this type of society is not nor must be taken 
as an organism, as freedom and rationality intervene in it
45
.  
The analysis of the sources of morality and religion have their starting-
point in the difference between natural order and social order, but then he states 
that this social order obeys a natural tendency (political animal)
46
 that develops 
while attempting the survival of the group, which is achieved by means of a 
strong internal cohesion and thus leads to war-making with others (homo 
homini lupus). In this type of society, war is therefore natural.  
This kind of societies are a great danger for others, because “where the 
forces developed by civilization are not subject to a moral idea, they are of 
need at the service of the instinct; and the force at the service of the instinct is 
                                                                                                                                 
la justice, à la vertu, et qu‟il y aurait peut-être réussi sans la fatalité qui s‟abattit sur lui à son 
retour en Amérique”; Bergson, H., in Mélange, p. 1556. 
44
  “Ne craignons pas d‟ajouter que la crainte de l‟opinion, du blâme, des châtiments, contribue 
sinon à fortifier, du moins à préciser le sentiment de l‟obligation, et nous ne faisons pas reposer 
ainsi le sentiment de l‟obligation sur une convention humaine, car la société n‟a pas d‟autre 
origine que l‟instinct moral, le désir de chaque homme de réaliser en lui l‟humanité. 
C‟est dans la vie sociale seulement que les puissances de l‟homme se développent. 
L‟instinct moral est donc à l‟origine de la société, il en est la cause, mais, comme il arrive 
souvent, l‟efect réagit sur sa cause et la société en se développant trouve sur sa route les moyens 
de fortifier artificiellement, chez certains de ses membres au moins, l‟instinct moral là où il 
risque d‟être en défaut”; Bergson, H., Cours de philosophie morale et politique, in Cours II, 
PUF, Paris, 1992, pp. 125-126. 
45
  Thus Bergson simultaneously accepts and rejects the two modern doctrines on the relations 
between human beings and society: “les rationalistes se placent au point de vue du droit et de 
l‟idéal, les naturalistes au point de vue du fait et de l‟histoire. Le développement des sociétés 
ressemble assez au développement de l‟organisme, mais il faut bien tenir compte des crises 
intelligentes, contingentes de la société, de l‟influence des grands hommes. Au point de vue du 
droit tout doit se passer comme si Rousseau avait absolument raison. L‟homme est porté par sa 
nature sensible à vivre en société et par là la société est un organisme. Mais ces unités sensibles 
réagissent sur la société parce qu‟elles sont intelligentes et libres”; Bergson, H., Cours II, p. 167.  
“La conception naturaliste de la société est vraie en fait. Elle ne tient guère compte que de 
la sensibilité humaine, de ces instincts et inclinations qui font de l‟homme un animal sociable, 
mais de ce point de vue on aperçoit clairement le caractère naturel des sociétés. Elle sont dans la 
nature puisqu‟elles répondent à des inclinations profondes, à un instinct primitif. En d‟autres 
termes l‟homme vit en société, y a toujours vécu et la sociabilité fait partie de l‟humanité.  
La thèse rationaliste est vraie en droit. Tandis que les sociétés animales ne sont que 
naturelles, la société humaine est en outre rationnelle. L‟homme connaît la loi morale, le devoir. 
De là la notion de droit, de là l‟idée de la valeur absolue de la personne humaine et comme 
conséquence nécessaire l‟affirmation de l‟égalité des personnes. C‟est pourquoi si la société 
résulte nécessairement de la nature même de l‟homme, si elle est un effet physique des instincts 
sociaux, néanmoins tout doit s‟y passer comme si elle résultait d‟un contrat par lequel tous 
s‟engagent vis-à-vis de tous. A cette condition seulement les obligations seront réciproques et 
les droit égaux. La première thèse est donc vraie en fait, la deuxième en droit”; p. 169.  
46
  “We say there is a natural human society, vaguely prefigured in us, for which nature has 
been careful enough to give us the schema in advance, allowing total breadth to our intelligence 
and will to follow its indications. This vague and incomplete schema would correspond, in the 
realm of reasonable, free activity, to the now precise schema of an anthill or a bee-hive in the 
case of instinct, at the other extreme of evolution”; Bergson, H, Las dos fuentes, p. 349.  
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called barbarianism. Therefore I have said that development of material 
power by civilization, when it considers it enough in itself, may lead mankind 
to barbarianism”47.  
When dealing with these societies, Bergson considers that others marked 
by openness must be reached. This is one of the best-known distinctions of this 
political philosopher. Then the key question on this point is how to avoid the 
closure of societies. Philosophy has a role to play here, but politics has a 
greater one, according to the definition of the political man: “In order to re-
establish the balance, our philosophy is certainly not enough […] But the motto 
I would suggest to the philosopher, and even to the most common man, is the 
most simple of all, and I believe, the most Cartesian. I would say that we must 
act like a man of thought and think like a man of action”48. However, Bergson 
does not mean that theory is the best form of praxis; rather that praxis has its 
own autonomy. Thus it is that philosophy on its own will not be able to reform 
the social tissue
49
.  
The openness of human societies requires awareness of the openness of 
man to humanity, but as this opening does not spring from any natural 
tendency
50
, it means, firstly, the free action of some people, those who grasp it 
intuitively and offer it to the other human beings, who tend to imitate them: the 
geniuses, saints, artists, charismatic leaders. These exceptional beings have 
overcome the original limited meaning of politics. So the objective of politics, 
in this situation, is dominance. That is the profile or temperament of a boss, but 
not of a charismatic leader
51
. 
This action manages to transform society into an open society: “This new 
form is enough to lay emphasis above all on intelligence. Yet it is true that in 
animal societies we can find a certain division of labour similar to that of 
human societies. But what characterizes human society is the faculty to react 
against purely physical laws (which favour general inequality due to the 
diversity of functions), and formulate, after having devised it, the equality of 
rights and of persons. […]. To summarize, the error of naturalism is to have 
approached human society at that aspect it has in common with animal 
societies, that is: the division of labour and heterogeneity of the elements. It 
has not seen the human aspect, that is: the perfect homogeneity of the elements, 
the equality of all in right […] We could say that human society, which in 
principle is no more than an organism and a prolongation of the individual 
merely because of the effect of nature, tends more and more due to the 
                                                 
47
  Bergson, H., “Bergson à A. Hébrard. (Le Temps, 24 January 1915, p. 1). Progrès matériel et 
progrès moral”, in Mélanges, pp. 1138-1139. 
48
  Bergson, H., “Message au congrès Descartes. Il faut agir en homme de pensée et penser en 
homme d‟action”, in Mélanges, p. 1575, p. 1579. 
49
  This is the meaning of his speech in honour of E. Ollivier. Cfr. Bergson, H., Mélanges, p. 
1283.  
50
  “The route of amplification will never function to go from a closed society to an open one, 
from the city to humankind. Their essence is different”; Bergson, H., Las dos fuentes, p. 340.  
51
  However, Bergson does not give enough detail, as would be desirable, on the difference 
between them.  
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influence of reason and freedom to become an assembly where each 
individual exists for himself and affirms his independence”52.  
For Bergson this openness is the establishment of democracy, as “of all 
political concepts, democracy is the most distant from nature, the only one that 
transcends, in intention at least, the conditions of a „closed society‟. It ascribes 
inviolable rights to man and these rights, in order to remain inviolable, demand 
from everyone an inalterable fidelity to duty”53. This explains the idealistic 
image Bergson has of his homeland and of the United States, as the places 
where revolution gave birth to democracy, which “for a start and above all, 
enters the world as a protest. Every sentence of the Declaration of Human 
Rights is a challenge to injustice. When summarizing the complaints made to 
the Actes des États-Generaux, Émile Faguet somewhere wrote that the 
Revolution was not carried out for freedom and equality, but simply „because 
people were dying of hunger‟”54. 
Secondly, true openness demands the cooperation of nations, and therefore, 
the creation of international organizations. The main problem is that, under no 
circumstances, does openness mean exalting oneself. Thus openness is not 
achieved by alliance, empire or a nation which seeks to exalt itself.
55
. Bergson 
indicates patriotism on the one hand. 
On the other, he indicates the creation of international organizations, 
beginning with the League of Nations, which is not easy and will not be able to 
solve all problems. Bergson analyses the diplomatic-judicial model proposed 
by Wilson and concludes that the main problem is that nations, unlike persons, 
do not have to recognize a judge from amongst themselves, and especially, that 
their problems are not litigation, but le différend because they have nothing in 
common
56
. In the presence of the American version, the Frenchman suggests 
fostering knowledge of other nations and their cultures, and international 
cooperation mainly on economic and demographic matters
57
, which would not 
eliminate the principle of national sovereignty and at the same time would 
emphasize the awareness of interdependency of the different nations. Then 
again, he does not forget his critical outlook and soon states that the most 
important problem is that the institutions are not truly worldwide, although 
                                                 
52
  Bergson, H., Cours II, pp. 170-171.  
53
  Bergson, H., Las dos fuentes, pp. 358-359.  
54
  Bergson, H., Las dos fuentes, p. 360. “In the democratic state of the soul there is a great 
effort, directed opposed to nature ”; Bergson, H., Las dos fuentes, p. 361.  
55
  Cfr. Bergson, H., Las dos fuentes, pp. 351-352. The Frenchman was very aware, and spoke 
publicly of the danger of the rise of Nazism. Cfr. Bergson, H., Participation at the Congrès 
mondial juif, probably in 1934, reported in the Horace Kallen papers, Yivo Institute for Jewish 
Research, 20740.  
56
  Cfr. Soulez, P., Bergson politique, pp. 288-289.  
57
  “Eliminating these causes or lessening their effect, this is the principal task of an 
international organization that aims to abolish war. The most serious cause is over-population”; 
Bergson, H., Las dos fuentes, p. 369. “It is a perilous error to think that an international 
organization can achieve a definitive peace without intervening, with authority, in the legislation 
of several countries and perhaps even in their government”; Bergson, H., Las dos fuentes, p. 
370.  
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they are effective; therefore he includes the “international organizations 
beside the „small means‟ that humanity has to avoid its self-destruction”58. 
In conclusion, we can say for Bergson the philosopher in his role as 
philosopher must not interfere in politics. We can also say that politics is the 
area of decision-making, where good sense plays a key role; but it doesn‟t have 
any magic recipes or miraculous solutions. True politics is practised by very 
few people who are capable of finding how to overcome politics as dominion 
that leads to war and violence, because they have found a means of dialogue 
with others, a means of knowing them and cooperating with them to establish 
justice and democracy. Clearly, this task is extremely complicated and always 
runs the risk of failure, including that of never beginning: “A decision must be 
taken. Humanity whimpers, semi-crushed under the weight of its own progress. 
It is not aware enough that its future depends on itself. It is its own 
responsibility, for a start, to decide if it wishes to keep on living. And then 
humanity must ask itself if it merely wishes to live, or if, on the contrary, it will 
make the effort necessary for the fulfilment, even on our reluctant planet, of the 
essential function of the universe which is a machine for the creation of 
gods”59.  
                                                 
58
  Cfr. Soulez, P., Bergson politique, pp. 292-293.  
59
  Bergson, H., Las dos fuentes, p. 404.  
